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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT DESPAIN, : Amended Brief 
Defendant/Appellant : Appellate Case No. 20060769-CA 
v. : Priority No. : 2 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 77-18a-l 
and U.C.A. 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE # 1: Did the arresting officer, Deputy Spotten, have probable cause to 
arrest the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence based on the Defendant's erratic 
driving pattern, the single car accident with a stationary trailer, the Defendant's panicked 
and paranoid demeanor, and the Defendant's allegedly slurred speech, absent an odor of 
alcohol or marijuana or others signs that the Defendant had consumed or was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 'This court reviews a trial court's legal 
determination of probable cause for correctness, affording some discretion to the trial 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motions to Suppress 
Evidence, as well as the subsequent entry of his conviction and sentence for Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree felony, and Driving Under the Influence, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, entered as a result of the Defendant's guilty plea pursuant to State 
v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct.App.1988) It is the position of the Appellant that the trial 
court erred in denying the Defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence Based on Lack of 
Probable Cause to Arrest and Improper Inventory Search. 
Course of Proceedings Below: 
The Defendant was arrested on May 6, 2004, after the Defendant was involved in 
a single car accident. The Defendant was placed under arrest for DUI and pursuant to the 
Defendant's arrest for DUI, the Defendant's vehicle was impounded and an inventory 
search was conducted. During the search of the Defendant's vehicle officers discovered a 
backpack which contained methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. The 
Defendant was subsequently charged with Count 1, Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with the Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony, Count 2, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, Count 3, 
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Count 4, Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
The Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing, entered a plea of not 
guilty and an Evidentiary Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was 
set for April 11, 2005. Prior to the evidentiary hearing the parties filed numerous 
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pleadings. On March 1, 2005, the Defendant filed his Motion and Memorandum to 
Suppress Evidence. On March 15, 2005, the State filed the State's Memorandum 
Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress. On March 15, 2005, the Defendant filed his 
Objection to State's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
Motion to Strike. On March 18, 2005, the Defendant filed his reply to State's 
Memorandum Opposing Motion to Suppress Evidence. At the April 11, 2005, 
Evidentiary Hearing, the court heard testimony from 2 witnesses, Deputy Edward 
Spotten, and Sgt. Jason Mazuran. Following the Evidentiary Hearing, the court gave the 
parties an opportunity to file Supplemental Memorandum to address the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. On April 25, 2005, the Defendant filed his 
Supplemental Motion and Memorandum to Suppress Evidence. On May 9, 2005, the 
state filed the State's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
After receiving and reviewing all pleadings filed by the parties as well as an 
unofficial transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. After several drafts, the Court finally signed the Second Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 15, 2005. Following the entry of 
the Court's Order denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on January 5, 2006, the 
Defendant filed his Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order which 
was subsequently denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 8, 2006. Following 
the Denial of the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, on April 28, 2006, the Defendant 
entered a plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree felony, 
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car and that the Defendant was acting paranoid about his vehicle. (Transcript pg. 22-23) 
Sergeant Jason Mazuran also assisted in the investigation. Sgt. Mazuran described the 
Defendant's behavior as panicked however when the Defendant told Sgt. Mazuran that he 
had called someone to come get him, a family member, Sgt. Mazuran told him "that was 
fine." (Transcript pg. 37) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
It is the Defendant's first contention that the trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Suppress on the ground that the arresting officer lacked 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Although the Defendant had been 
involved in an accident, officers had not observed sufficient facts that would have 
reasonably led the officers to believe that the Defendant was under the influence of drugs 
and/or alcohol prior to arresting him for DUI. In order to make an arrest for DUI, the 
arresting officer must have reason to believe that the Defendant was under the influence 
of drugs and/or alcohol. Absent a reasonable belief that the Defendant was under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant for DUI. Furthermore, the only legal authority the officers had for 
impounding and conducting an inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was based on 
his arrest for DUI. Therefore absent probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI, the 
inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was illegal and any evidenced seized during 
the inventory search should have been suppressed as well as any other evidence obtained 
8 
following the Defendant's arrest including inculpatory statements and the results of the 
Defendant's chemical test. 
The Defendant's second contention is that the trial Court erred in finding that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine was applicable in this case to excuse the illegal inventory 
search of the Defendant's vehicle. The trial court found that the State had failed to 
present sufficient evidence to show that the "inventory search" of the Defendant's vehicle 
was done properly pursuant to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs standardized 
impound/inventory search policy and procedure. Despite the Court's conclusion that the 
State had failed to show that the inventory search conducted at the scene was conducted 
properly and according to the standardized policy, the Court found that "had the vehicle 
been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory search been conducted, the 
contraband would have been inevitably discovered." It is the position of the Defendant 
that the Court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine under the facts and 
circumstances of this case was improper due to the fact that the search that led to the 
discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia was the illegal inventory search. Under the 
circumstances of this case, the inventory search was the final search, the end of the road 
so to speak, and there would not have been any further independent reason or basis for an 
additional search following the improperly conducted inventory search at the scene. This 
is evidenced by the fact that no further searches were conducted on the Defendant's 
vehicle after the botched inventory search at the scene. Likewise even if a second proper 
inventory search had been conducted, any evidence obtained during the initial improper 
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inventory search must still be suppressed. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 
1114,1117 (Utah App. 1997), which requires that a police agency adopt a standardized 
policy and procedure for conducting inventory searches of vehicles and that officers 
conducting an inventory search must follow the standardized policy and procedure 
adopted by the agency, the search of the Defendant's vehicle in this case was illegal and 
any evidence seized during the course of the improper inventory search should have been 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEPUTY SPOTTEN LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
THE DEFENDANT AT THE SCENE FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-44 OR WHILE 
DRIVING WITH A MEASURABLE AMOUNT OF METABOLITE 
IN THE BODY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-44.6 
It is the position of the Defendant that the arresting officer did not have probable 
cause to place the Defendant under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and therefore 
the officer obtained evidence in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Probable cause is met when "whether from the facts 
known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly may be drawn therefrom, a 
reasonable and prudent person in [the arresting officer's] position would be justified in 
believing that [the driver] had committed the offense." Lavton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 
1035, 1037 (Utah 1987). "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances 
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within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [personolice office] of reasonable 
caution in the belief that 'an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Dorsev, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)(quoting Brinagar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-
176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed 1879 (1949)). 
Furthermore, the determination of probable cause to arrest is an "objective" 
standard based on a totality of the circumstnaces known to the officer at the time he made 
the decision to place the suspect under arrest. 
As required by the Fourth Amendment, to justify a wrrantless arrest 
"an officer must have probabel cause . . . 'to believe that the supsect 
has committed or is committing an offense.'" Id. at ^ 26 (citation 
omitted). Probable cuase determinations are reviewed un an 
"objective standard: whther from the facts known to the officer, and 
the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable 
and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed the offense'" for which he 
was arrested. Id. at f 27 (alterations in original)(quoting State v. 
Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)(additional citatiosn omitted)). 
IN other words, "we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and 
then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the 
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amoutn to 
'probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 
800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003)(citation omitted). 
However, we do not examine these facts in isolation, but rather we 
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether " 'a 
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution [would believe based 
upon the] circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit'ft the offence for which he is 
arrestedChansamone, 2003 UT App 107 at f 1L 69 P.3d 293 
(quoting Trane, 2002 UT 97 at If 27, 57 
1052). 
State v. Hechtle. 89 P.3d 185, 188-89 (Utah App.2004) 
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According to Deputy Spotten's testimony on direct examination at the evidentiary 
hearing, "based on the fact that he had crashed, based on the information received from 
witnesses, um I came to the conclusion that, that he was under the influence of 
something. That was my, my I have probable cause to believe so and was going to effect 
a DUI arrest..." (Transcript pg. 8) Likewise, according to the DUI Summons and 
Citation prepared by Deputy Spotten in this case, the Defendant was cited and arrested 
for either a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (DUI) or Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 
(DUI Metabolite). Thus the determination made by the District Court and to be reviewed 
by this Court is whether or not there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant 
for DUI. 
Under Utah law, an officer may arrest an individual for Driving Under the 
Influence in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 when the officer has probable cause 
to believe the driver has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
or that the driver "is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating 
a vehicle." Likewise, Under Utah Code Ann. §44-6-44.6, more commonly referred to as 
the "DUI Metabolite" statute, a "person may not operate or be in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body." Thus a police officer may 
only arrest an individual for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §44-6-44.6 when the officer 
has probable cause to believe the driver of a vehicle has a "measurable controlled 
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substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. " Therefore, in 
order for an officer to arrest a suspect for DUI, the officer must have reason to believe 
that the suspect is "under the influence" of drugs and/or alcohol. Absent a reasonable 
belief that the suspect is "under the influence" of drugs and/or alcohol, an officer may 
have probable cause to arrest the suspect for another crime but he does not have probable 
cause to make an arrest for DUI. 
In the present case, Deputy Spotten testified that at the time he made up his mind 
to arrest the Defendant for DUI, he hadn't seen any signs of either alcohol consumption 
or drug consumption. On cross examination, Deputy Spotten engaged in the following 
exchange with defense counsel: 
Schatz: So at that point it was your primary determination that you were going 
to arrest him for DUI, based on the erratic driving pattern? 
Officer: After I had spoken with the witnesses, and uh, the fact that the crash 
didn't make any sense, why someone would crash into a parked trailer 
at the side of the road with no other contributing circumstances. Yes. 
Schatz: Kay. But you hadn't seen any signs of alcohol consumption or 
drug consumption at that point had you? 
Officer: I did not. 
(Transcript pg. 15) 
It appears as though Deputy Spotten's decision to arrest the Defendant was based 
entirely on the driving pattern and the resulting crash. Clearly this information is not 
sufficient to support probable cause to arrest for DUI as a critical element of either a 
standard DUI or a Metabolite DUI is the consumption of drugs or alcohol and that the 
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driver is "under the influence" at the time of driving. During the course of the hearing, 
Deputy Spotten testified that his belief was further supported by his alleged observation 
that the Defendant's speech was slurred and the opinion of EMT's on the scene that the 
Defendant appeared to be acting "paranoid" since the Defendant had expressed concern 
about securing his belongings inside his vehicle. However, Deputy Spotten also testified 
that he did not observe the odor of alcohol or any illegal drugs such as marijuana, the 
Defendant denied consuming any drugs or alcohol when specifically asked, Deputy 
Spotten did not observe any problems with the Defendant's ability to balance, and he did 
not observe any other common physical characteristics of drug or alcohol consumption 
such as red, glossy, droopy, or watery eyes, flushed face, relaxed facial tones, etc. He 
simply assumed that the accident could not have occurred if the Defendant was not under 
the influence. 
The State argued that Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the Defendant 
for Driving Under the Influence of a controlled substance because witnesses observed the 
Defendant driving erratically before the accident and emergency personnel told Deputy 
Spotten that the Defendant kept worrying about objects inside his vehicle. These are the 
only factors the State presented to establish probable cause to arrest the Defendant for 
DUI. These factors alone are clearly insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. The fact 
that the Defendant was driving erratically does not clearly indicate that he was under the 
influence. There are numerous reasons why a person may drive erratically or even be 
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involved in an accident which having nothing to do with drugs or alcohol. A person may 
drive poorly if they were late for work, if they were suffering from a lack of sleep, or if 
they were talking on a cell phone. The State also argued that the Defendant was acting 
"paranoid" and kept worrying about objects in his vehicle. The fact that the Defendant 
was concerned about objects in his vehicle before it was towed away from the scene after 
an accident is normal. The Defendant may have had a lap top computer, school work, 
CD's or other valuables in his backpack that he did not want to be lost or left in his 
vehicle when it was towed to the storage yard. 
It is important to note that Deputy Spotten specifically stated that the arrest was 
only for DUI. He did not indicate that the Defendant was being arrested for any other 
offense therefore the court's decision on whether or not there was probable cause to arrest 
must be limited to evaluating whether there was probable cause to arrest the Defendant 
for DUI (Pursuant to either Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6) and not any other 
offense. What is particularly relevant in this case is not what the officers observed but 
what they did not observe. Deputy Spotten did not notice an odor of alcohol or marijuana 
coming from the Defendant. Deputy Spotten did not observe any physical signs that the 
Defendant had ingested alcohol or a controlled substance. Deputy Spotten did not 
observe any drugs or contraband in plain view, and when he asked the Defendant if he 
had been using drugs the Defendant replied "No". Deputy Spotten did not conduct any 
field sobriety tests and did not note in his report that he observed anything abnormal 
about the Defendant's eyes or his balance. 
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The determination of probable cause to arrest requires that the Court take a totality 
of the circumstances approach. Taking a "totality of the circumstances approach" and 
taking into account all of the factors observed by Deputy Spotten as well as those he did 
not observe, there was not sufficient evidence known to Deputy Spotten while he was at 
the scene of the accident that would lead "a reasonable and prudent person in [the 
arresting officer's] position" to believe that Mr. Despain was operating a vehicle while 
under the influence of a controlled substance. Deputy Spotten himself testified that he 
"hadn't seen any signs of alcohol consumption or drug consumption" at the point he 
made his determination he was going to arrest the Defendant for DUI (Transcript pg. 15) 
Therefore absent a reasonable belief that the Defendant had consumed drugs or alcohol, 
Deputy Spotten lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Although he may 
have had probable cause to cite the Defendant for Reckless Driving or Negligent 
Collision, he did not have probable cause to arrest him for DUI. 
II. THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE TO EXCUSE THE IMPROPER INVENTORY SEARCH 
Even if this Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the Defendant for 
DUI, it is the position of the Defendant that the "inventory search" of the Defendant's 
vehicle was improperly conducted, as correctly determined by the District Court, but the 
District Court erred in concluding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to excuse 
the improper inventory search. 
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Based on the findings of fact entered by the District Court, the District Court 
Came to the legal conclusion that "3. The State's theory of 'search incident to lawful 
arrest' was not consistent with Utah case law." Despite the conclusion that the search of 
the Defendant's vehicle was not justified under the "search incident to lawful arrest" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the Court found that "4. 
There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.6 and U.C.A 
§ 41-6-44.30." Thus, the Court determined that the search of the Defendant's vehicle 
was properly undertaken as an "inventory search" but went on to conclude that "7. The 
State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was properly 
carried out." However, even though the Court concluded that the "inventory search" was 
not carried out properly, the Court finally concluded that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine was applicable. The Court reached the ultimate legal conclusion that "8. 
However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot an a proper inventory search 
been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered." 
The Courts application of inevitable discovery doctrine in this case was improper 
under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. The basic principle of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine is that evidence obtained during an illegal search may still 
be admissible if the prosecution can prove that even had the illegal search not taken 
place, the evidence would have been "inevitably" discovered by other independent legal 
means. In State v. Topanotes, 76 P. 3d. 1159 (Utah 2003), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court wrote that: 
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The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both 
primary and derivative (the "fruit of unlawful police misconduct"), 
obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional and statutory 
rights. Nix v.Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) 
The inevitable discovery doctrine at issue in this case is similar to the 
independent source doctrine; it enables courts to look to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and 
asks whether the police would have discovered the evidence despite 
the illegality. "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale 
has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Nix, 467 
U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501. 
State v. Topanotes. 76 P. 3d. 1159, 1162 (Utah 2003) 
The Court went on to discuss the requirement of an "independent source" or 
"independent investigation" which would have led to the discovery of the illegally 
obtained evidence. 
A crucial element of the inevitable discovery is independence; there 
must be some "independent basis for discovery," Boatwright, 822 
F.2d at 865, and "the investigation that inevitably would have led to 
the evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional violation," 
Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. Thus, "the fact or likelihood that makes the 
discovery inevitable [must] arise from circumstances other than those 
disclosed by the illegal search itself." Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864-
65. For courts confidently to predict what would have occurred, but 
did not actually occur, there must be persuasive evidence of events or 
circumstances apart from those resulting in illegal police activity that 
would have inevitably led to discovery. Routine or standard police 
procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation for 
inevitable discovery, even if not part of a separate, concurrent 
investigation. For example, police searches that would occur after 
the evidence is legally in their custody, such as routine inventory 
searches of vehicles impounded after the driver is arrested, are often 
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persuasive evidence of potential independent sources of discovery. 
See, e.g. United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (5th 
Cir.1993); United States v. Horn. 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th Cir.1992) 
State v. Topanotes. 76 P. 3d. 1159, 1163 (Utah 2003) 
In the present case, the District Court ruled that the State had failed to show that 
the inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle was carried out properly according to 
policy. As such, pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 
1114 (Utah App.1997) any evidence obtained during an improper and therefore illegal 
inventory search should have been suppressed. However, despite finding that the 
inventory search of Defendant's vehicle was not proper, the District Court applied the 
inevitable discovery doctrine to excuse the illegal inventory search and admit the 
evidence. The District Court's reasoning for doing so was that "had the vehicle been 
towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory search been conducted, the contraband 
would have been inevitably discovered." The District Court's conclusion that the 
evidence was admissible as it would have been inevitably discovered is fundamentally 
flawed for two reasons. 
First, as set forth above, in order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the 
Court must find that there was some other "independent investigation" or "independent 
source" which would have led to the discovery of the evidence separate from the illegal 
search. In the present case the District Court has not identified any other "independent 
investigation" or "independent source" which would have led to the discovery of the 
evidence separate from an inventory search of the Defendant's vehicle. The Court 
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improperly assumes that there was or would have been a second inventory search 
conducted at the impound lot. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not 
support such an assumption. To the contrary, there was no evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing in this matter from which the District Court could reasonably have 
concluded that the officers intended to or did in fact conduct a second inventory search 
after the Defendant's vehicle was towed to the impound lot. 
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Topanotes, "Routine or standard police 
procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation for inevitable discovery, even 
if not part of a separate, concurrent investigation. For example, police searches that 
would occur after the evidence is legally in their custody, such as routine inventory 
searches of vehicles impounded after the driver is arrested, are often persuasive evidence 
of potential independent sources of discovery." Topanotes, at 1163 (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court found that an inventory search would often serve as the basis for 
finding that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered during a subsequent 
inventory search. In other words, the inventory search typically acts as the final 
opportunity for evidence to be discovered by legal means because it is typically the last 
search conducted on the vehicle. In the present case it is the inventory search itself that 
the District Court found was improper. The inventory search in this case was the final 
opportunity the officers had to search the Defendant's vehicle. In this case, they chose to 
take that opportunity at the scene and in doing so they failed to follow proper procedure 
in conducting the inventory search which resulted in the discovery of the evidence the 
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Defendant sought to have suppressed. So unless the prosecution has established that the 
vehicle would have been searched as a result of some other "independent investigation" 
or "independent source" separate from the improper inventory search, any evidence 
obtained during the improper inventory search must be suppressed. The prosecution 
presented no evidence whatsoever that there was any sort of "independent investigation" 
or other "independent sources" that would have led to a search of the Defendant's 
vehicle. According to the testimony of the offices the search was being carried out as an 
inventory search due to the fact that the Defendant's vehicle was to be impounded as a 
result of his arrest for DUI. They were not investigating the Defendant for drug activity 
or in the process of obtaining a search warrant based on other information. Therefore the 
State has failed to establish that absent the illegal inventory search, the evidence would 
have been inevitably discovered as the result of any other "independent investigation" or 
"independent source" thus the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable under the 
facts and circumstances of this case. 
Secondly, even under the Court's assumption that there somehow would have 
been a second proper inventory search conducted on the vehicle after it had been towed 
to the impound lot and during a subsequent proper inventory search the contraband would 
have been inevitably discovered, this does not excuse the prior illegal inventory search at 
the scene and allow for the admission of the evidence discovered during the initial illegal 
inventory search at the scene. The District Court's final legal conclusion contained in 
paragraph # 8 seems to imply that officers would always be allowed to correct an initial 
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improper inventory search at the scene where the evidence was illegally discovered by 
towing the vehicle to an impound lot and conducting a second proper inventory search at 
a later time. Such a conclusion is contrary to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in Giron 
which ruled that evidence that was obtained during an improperly carried out inventory 
search must be suppressed based on the officer's failure to follow proper procedure in 
conducting the inventory search which actually resulted in the discovery of the evidence. 
In Giron, there were in fact two inventory searches done. The first search was 
conducted by Officer Bench who made the initial traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle. 
During Officer Bench's search he located several items of evidence of drugs and 
paraphernalia which the Defendant later moved to suppress. The Court found that the 
search by Officer Bench was not conducted according to Salt Lake City's inventory 
search policy and therefore was an illegal search. The State argued that the illegality of 
Officer Bench's initial inventory search was obviated by a second search later conducted 
by Officer Russell who did follow the proper procedure for conducting an inventory 
search. The Court found that the later, yet proper, search by Officer Russell was 
irrelevant. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling that the State failed to 
show that the inventory search conducted by Officer Bench, which resulted in the 
discovery of the evidence, was not done properly therefore any evidence obtained during 
the inventory search conducted by Officer Bench was obtained in violation of the 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore inadmissible under the 
inventory search regardless of whether or not Officer Russell's later inventory search was 
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conducted properly.1 
Thus, although there was absolutely no evidence presented from which the Court 
could reasonably have concluded that a second inventory search was done or would have 
been done in the present case, even if a second inventory search had been done and even 
if that second inventory search would have been conducted properly according to the Salt 
Lake County Sheriffs policy and procedure governing inventory searches, the propriety 
of the second search would not have excused the illegality of the initial improper 
inventory search at the scene and any evidence obtained during the initial improper 
inventory search must still be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasons set forth above the Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the District Court's ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant for DUI in this case and rule that any evidence obtained by officers following 
the Defendant's arrest for DUI be suppressed. The Defendant further requests that this 
Court rule that the District Court erred in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in 
this case and rule that any evidence obtained during the search of the Defendant's vehicle 
also be suppressed. Finally, based on the suppression of the evidence as requested, the 
1
 Although the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling that the inventory search conducted by Officer 
Bench was invalid and that the evidence obtained during the inventory search could not be admitted pursuant to the 
inventory search, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings to determine 
if the search was a constitutionally reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. 
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Defendant moves this Court to reverse his convictions for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and Driving Under the Influence and order that both charges be dismissed. 
DATED this day, December 15, 2006. 
Jason Schatz 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Addendum A 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
41-6-44.6 Definitions - Driving with any measurable controlled substance in the 
body - Penalties - Arrest without warrant. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance scheduled under Section 58-37-4 . 
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 . 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 . 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2 . 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44 , a person may not operate or 
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body. 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled 
substance was involuntarily ingested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for 
use by the accused. 
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person convicted under Subsection (2); 
(b) revoke, for one year, the driver license of a person convicted of a second or 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined 
under Subsection 41-6-44 (1), if the violation is committed within a period often years 
after the date of the prior violation; and 
(c) subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231 , if the previous 
suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(7) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and assessment, educational 
series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to pay all fines and fees, including fees for 
restitution and treatment costs, the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a 
failure to comply. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's 
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221 (2) and (3). 
(8) The court shall order supervised probation in accordance with Subsection 41-6-44(14) 
for a person convicted under Subsection (2). 
41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration - Measurement of blood or 
breath alcohol - Criminal punishment - Arrest without warrant - Penalties -
Suspension or revocation of license. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle[.] 
41-6-4430 Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace officers - Impound 
requirements - Removal of vehicle by owner. 
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-
44 , 41-6-44.6 , or 41-6-44.10 , or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which 
complies with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the peace officer shall seize and impound the 
vehicle in accordance with Section 41-6-102.5 , except as provided under Subsection (2). 
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present at the time of 
arrest, the peace officer may release the vehicle to that registered owner, but only if: 
(a) the registered owner: 
(i) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene; and 
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identification to prove ownership of the vehicle 
or motorboat; 
(b) the registered owner identifies a driver with a valid operator's license who: 
(i) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and 
(ii) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section 41-6-44 ,41-6-
44.6 , or 41-6-44.10 , or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which complies with 
Subsection 41-6-43 (1), if permitted to operate the vehicle; and 
(c) the vehicle itself is legally operable. 
(3) If necessary for transportation of a motorboat for impoundment under this section, the 





IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERT N. DESPAIN, 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 041904962 
JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
Having heard the facts of this case and having heard argument by both parties, the Court 
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported traffic accident. 
2. Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6:25 p.m., Deputy Spotten observed 
that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the accident. 
3. Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car had 
crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the road. 
4. Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain, who was 
the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered three other witnesses. 
/ 
Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At this time, 
the defendant was leaning against the trailer, hi response to Deputy Spotten's 
questions, the defendant denied having consumed alcohol or having used any 
drugs. 
Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while he was 
speaking with him. 
Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana emanating from 
the defendant. 
Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view" prior to 
the search. 
The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha Gallyer, 
described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They told Deputy Spotten 
that they had observed the defendant driving erratically that prior to striking the 
parked trailer. Specifically, they indicated that the defendant ran another car off 
the road, ran over a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was 
swerving across the entire road. 
After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") based on 
the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident, and his demeanor. 
Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the 
defendant DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and "for inventory 
purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded. 
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Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately because Salt 
Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had arrived and had placed the 
defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut on the defendant's head that he had 
sustained from the accident. 
Because Salt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant to the 
hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety tests. 
Medical personnel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was acting 
paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about his car. 
Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked his car to 
keep people out. 
Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to perform a 
search of the car. 
Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under arrest when 
he retrieved the keys, but does not recall. 
After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two individuals, one 
male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the scene. 
These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a backpack 
from the back seat. 
Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to the car. 
Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also responded 
to the scene. 
Sergeant Mazuran interacted and observed the defendant. 
Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked. 
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In order to assist deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an inventory search 
of the vehicle, 
The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m. 
Sergeant Mazuran characterized the searcli of the vehicle as an inventory search, 
in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax Impoundment. 
Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office procedure 
for impounding vehicles. 
The policy required that the vehicle be searched, items be located and listed on an 
inventory. 
As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took those items to 
Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had been found. 
Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific items found or 
where they were found. 
Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report in this 
case, but another deputy on the scene did. 
While Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated to Deputy 
Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant. Deputy Spotten followed 
the ambulance to the hospital. 
Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag of 
marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side. 
Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the hospital. 
After medical personnel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly remembers placing 
the defendant under arrest. This was at approximately 7:20 p.m. 
Sergeant Mazurarf s search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a box. 
Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that was prepared 
for distribution. 
Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the 
Influence, The probable cause was based on the erratic driving pattern reported 
by the witnesses, the single car accident with a stationary trailer that was off the 
road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid demeanor, and the defendant's 
slurred speech. 
The defendant was not actually placed under arrest at the scene; rather, he was 
placed under arrest at the hospital. 
The State's theory of'search incident to arrest" under these facts is not consistent 
with Utah case law7. 
There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.6 
and §41-6-44.30. 
Insufficient information was presented to the Court to allow7 it to conclude, one 
way or another, whether the inventory search was done according to policy. 
The State must show7 that the inventory search was done according to policy. 
The State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was 
properly carried out. 
However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory 
search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered. 
m 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. 
SIGNED this 16thday of December, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBER' 
Third Judicial District Court Jud°e * 
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